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Abstract
We present a second iteration of a machine learning approach to static code analysis and
fingerprinting for weaknesses related to security, software engineering, and others using the
open-source MARF framework and the MARFCAT application based on it for the NIST’s
SATE IV static analysis tool exposition workshop’s data sets that include additional test
cases, including new large synthetic cases. To aid detection of weak or vulnerable code,
including source or binary on different platforms the machine learning approach proved to
be fast and accurate to for such tasks where other tools are either much slower or have much
smaller recall of known vulnerabilities. We use signal and NLP processing techniques in our
approach to accomplish the identification and classification tasks. MARFCAT’s design from
the beginning in 2010 made is independent of the language being analyzed, source code,
bytecode, or binary. In this follow up work with explore some preliminary results in this
area. We evaluated also additional algorithms that were used to process the data.
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1 Introduction
This is a follow up work on the first incarnation of MARFCAT detailed in [Mok10d, Mok11].
Thus, the majority of the results content here addresses the newer iteration duplicating only
the necessary background and methodology information (reduced). The reader is deferred to
consult the expanded background information and results in that previous work freely accessible
online (and the arXiv version of that is still occasionally updated).
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We elaborate on the details of the expanded methodology and the corresponding results of
application of the machine learning techniques along with signal and NLP processing to static
source and binary code analysis in search for weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We use the tool,
named MARFCAT, a MARF-based Code Analysis Tool [Mok13], first exhibited at the Static
Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE) workshop in 2010 [ODBN10] to machine-learn from the (Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures) CVE-based vulnerable as well as synthetic CWE-based cases
to verify the fixed versions as well as non-CVE based cases from the projects written in same pro-
gramming languages. The 2nd iteration of this work was prepared based on SATE IV [ODBN12]
and uses its updated data set and application. On the NLP side, we employ simple classi-
cal NLP techniques (n-grams and various smoothing algorithms), also combined with machine
learning for novel non-NLP applications of detection, classification, and reporting of weaknesses
related to vulnerabilities or bad coding practices found in artificial constrained languages, such
as programming languages and their compiled counterparts. We compare and contrast the NLP
approach to the signal processing approach in our results summary and illustrate concrete results
and for the same test cases.
We claim that the presented machine learning approach is novel and highly beneficial in
static analysis and routine testing of any kind of code, including source code and binary de-
ployments for its efficiency in terms of speed, relatively high precision, robustness, and being a
complimentary tool to other approaches that do in-depth semantic analysis, etc. by prioritiz-
ing those tools’ targets. All that can be used in automatic manner in distributed and scalable
diverse environments to ensure the code safety, especially the mission critical software code in
all kinds of systems. It uses spectral, acoustic and language models to learn and classify such a
code.
This document, like its predecessor, is a “rolling draft” with several updates expected to be
made as the project progresses beyond SATE IV. It is accompanied with the updates to the
open-source MARFCAT tool itself [Mok13].
Organization
The related work, some of the present methodology is based on, is referenced in Section 2. The
data sets are described in Section 3. The methodology summary is in Section 4. We present
some of the results in Section 5 from the SAMATE reference test data set. Then we present
a brief summary, description of the limitations of the current realization of the approach and
concluding remarks in Section 6. In the Appendix there are classification result tables for specific
test cases illustrating top results by precision.
2 Related Work
To our knowledge this was the first time a machine learning approach was attempted to static
code analysis with the first results demonstrated during the SATE2010 workshop [Mok10d,
Mok13, ODBN10]. In the same year, a somewhat similar approach independently was presented
[BSSV10] for vulnerability classification and prediction using machine learning and SVMs, but
working with a different set of data.
Additional related work (to various degree of relevance or use) is further listed (this list is not
exhaustive). A taxonomy of Linux kernel vulnerability solutions in terms of patches and source
code as well as categories for both are found in [MLB07]. The core ideas and principles behind the
MARF’s pipeline and testing methodology for various algorithms in the pipeline adapted to this
case are found in [Mok08b, Mok10b] as it was the easiest implementation available to accomplish
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the task. There also one can find the majority of the core options used to set the configuration
for the pipeline in terms of algorithms used. A binary analysis using machine learning approach
for quick scans for files of known types in a large collection of files is described in [MD08].
This includes the NLP and machine learning for NLP tasks in DEFT2010 [Mok10c, Mok10a]
with the corresponding DEFT2010App and its predecessor for hand-written image processing
WriterIdentApp [MSS09]. Tlili’s 2009 PhD thesis covers topics on automatic detection of
safety and security vulnerabilities in open source software [Tli09]. Statistical analysis, ranking,
approximation, dealing with uncertainty, and specification inference in static code analysis are
found in the works of Engler’s team [KTB+06, KAYE04, KE03]. Kong et al. further advance
static analysis (using parsing, etc.) and specifications to eliminate human specification from the
static code analysis in [KZL10]. Spectral techniques are used for pattern scanning in malware
detection by Eto et al. in [ESI+09]. Some researchers propose a general data mining system for
incident analysis with data mining engines in [IYE+09]. Hanna et al. describe a synergy between
static and dynamic analysis for the detection of software security vulnerabilities in [HLYD09]
paving the way to unify the two analysis methods. Other researchers propose a MEDUSA
system for metamorphic malware dynamic analysis using API signatures in [NJG+10]. Some
of the statistical NLP techniques we used, are described at length in [MS02]. BitBlaze (and its
web counterpart, WebBlaze) are other recent types of tools that to static and dynamic binary
code analysis for vulnerabilities fast, developed at Berkeley [Son10a, Son10b]. For wavelets, for
example, Li et al. [LjXP+09] have shown wavelet transforms and k-means classification can be
used to identify communicating applications on a network fast and is relevant to our study of
the code in any form, text or binary.
3 Data Sets
We use the SAMATE data set to practically validate our approach. The SAMATE reference
data set contains C/C++, Java, and PHP language tracks comprising CVE-selected cases as
well as stand-alone cases and the large generated synthetic C and Java test cases (CWE-based,
with a lot of variants of different known weaknesses). SATE IV expanded some cases from
SATE2010 by increasing the version number, and dropped some other cases (e.g., Chrome).
The C/C++ and Java test cases of various client and server OSS software are compilable
into the binary and object code, while the synthetic C and Java cases generated for various
CWE entries provided for greater scalability testing (also compilable). The CVE-selected cases
had a vulnerable version of a software in question with a list of CVEs attached to it, as well
as the most known fixed version within the minor revision number. One of the goals for the
CVE-based cases is to detect the known weaknesses outlined in CVEs using static code analysis
and also to verify if they were really fixed in the “fixed version” [ODBN12]. The cases with
known CVEs and CWEs were used as the training models described in the methodology. The
summary below is a union of the data sets from SATE2010 and SATE IV. The preliminary list
of the CVEs that the organizers expect to locate in the test cases were collected from the NVD
[NIS13a, ODBN12] for Wireshark 1.2.0, Dovecot, Tomcat 5.5.13, Jetty 6.1.16, and Wordpress
2.0. The specific test cases with versions and language at the time included CVE-selected:
• C: Wireshark 1.2.0 (vulnerable) and Wireshark 1.2.18 (fixed, up from Wireshark 1.2.9 in
SATE2010)
• C: Dovecot (vulnerable) and Dovecot (fixed)
• C++: Chrome 5.0.375.54 (vulnerable) and Chrome 5.0.375.70 (fixed)
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• Java: Tomcat 5.5.13 (vulnerable) and Tomcat 5.5.33 (fixed, up from Tomcat 5.5.29 in
SATE2010)
• Java: Jetty 6.1.16 (vulnerable) and Jetty 6.1.26 (fixed)
• PHP: Wordpress 2.0 (vulnerable) and Wordpress 2.2.3 (fixed)
originally non-CVE selected in SATE2010:
• C: Dovecot
• Java: Pebble 2.5-M2
Synthetic CWE cases produced by the SAMATE team:
• C: Synthetic C covering 118 CWEs and ≈ 60K files
• Java: Synthetic Java covering ≈ 50 CWEs and ≈ 20K files
4 Methodology
In this section we outline the methodology of our approach to static source code analysis. Most
of this methodology is an updated description from [Mok10d]. The line number determination
methodology is also detailed in [Mok10d, ODBN10], but is not replicated here. Thus, the
methodology’s principles overview is described in Section 4.1, the knowledge base construction
is in Section 4.2, machine learning categories in Section 4.3, and the high-level algorithmic
description is in Section 4.4.
4.1 Methodology Overview
The core methodology principles include:
• Machine learning and dynamic programming
• Spectral and signal processing techniques
• NLP n-gram and smoothing techniques (add-δ, Witten-Bell, MLE, etc.)
We use signal processing techniques, i.e. presently we do not parse or otherwise work at the
syntax and semantics levels. We treat the source code as a “signal”, equivalent to binary, where
each n-gram (n = 2 presently, i.e. two consecutive characters or, more generally, bytes) are used
to construct a sample amplitude value in the signal. In the NLP pipeline, we similarly treat the
source code as a “characters”, where each n-gram (n = 1..3) is used to construct the language
model.
We show the system the examples of files with weaknesses and MARFCAT learns them
by computing spectral signatures using signal processing techniques or various language mod-
els (based on options) from CVE-selected test cases. When some of the mentioned techniques
are applied (e.g., filters, silence/noise removal, other preprocessing and feature extraction tech-
niques), the line number information is lost as a part of this process.
When we test, we compute either how similar or distant each file is from the known trained-on
weakness-laden files or compare trained language models with the unseen language fragments in
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the NLP pipeline. In part, the methodology can approximately be seen as some fuzzy signature-
based “antivirus” or IDS software systems detect bad signature, except that with a large number
of machine learning and signal processing algorithms and fuzzy matching, we test to find out
which combination gives the highest precision and best run-time.
At the present, however, we are looking at the whole files instead of parsing the finer-grain
details of patches and weak code fragments. This aspect lowers the precision, but is relatively
fast to scan all the code files.
4.2 CVEs and CWEs – the Knowledge Base
The CVE-selected test cases serve as a source of the knowledge base to gather information of
how known weak code “looks like” in the signal form [Mok10d], which we store as spectral
signatures clustered per CVE or CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration). The introduction by
the SAMATE team of a large synthetic code base with CWEs, serves as a part of knowledge
base learning as well. Thus, we:
• Teach the system from the CVE-based cases
• Test on the CVE-based cases
• Test on the non-CVE-based cases
For synthetic cases we do similarly:
• Teach the system from the CWE-based synthetic cases
• Test on the CWE-based synthetic cases
• Test on the CVE and non-CVE-based cases for CWEs from synthetic cases
We create index files in XML in the format similar to that of SATE to index all the file of
the test case under study. The CVE-based cases after the initial index generation are manually
annotated from the NVD database before being fed to the system. The script that does the
initial index gathering in the OSS distribution of MARFCAT is called collect-files-meta.
pl written in Perl. The synthetic cases required a special modification to that resulting in
collect-files-meta-synthetic.pl where there are no CVEs to fill in but CWEs alone, with
the auto-prefilled explanations since the information in the synthetic cases is not arbitrary and
controlled for identification.
4.3 Categories for Machine Learning
The tow primary groups of classes we train and test on include are naturally the CVEs [NIS13a,
NIS13b] and CWEs [VM13]. The advantages of CVEs is the precision and the associated meta
knowledge from [NIS13a, NIS13b] can be all aggregated and used to scan successive versions of
the the same software or derived products (e.g., WebKit in multiple browsers). CVEs are also
generally uniquely mapped to CWEs. The CWEs as a primary class, however, offer broader
categories, of kinds of weaknesses there may be, but are not yet well assigned and associated
with CVEs, so we observe the loss of precision. Since we do not parse, we generally cannot
deduce weakness types or even simple-looking aspects like line numbers where the weak code
may be. So we resort to the secondary categories, that are usually tied into the first two, which
we also machine-learn along, such as issue types (sink, path, fix) and line numbers.
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4.4 Algorithms
In our methodology we systematically test and select the best (a tradeoff between speed and
accuracy) combination(s) of the algorithm implementations available to us and then use only
those for subsequent testing. This methodology is augmented with the cases when the knowledge
base for the same code type is learned from multiple sources (e.g., several independent C test
cases).
4.4.1 Signal Pipeline
Algorithmically-speaking, the steps that are performed in the machine-learning signal based
analysis are in Figure 1. The specific algorithms come from the classical literature and other
sources and are detailed in [Mok08b] and the related works. To be more specific for this work,
the loading typically refers to the interpretation of the files being scanned in terms of bytes
forming amplitude values in a signal (as an example, 8kHz or 16kHz frequency) using either uni-
gram, bi-gram, or tri-gram approach. Then, the preprocessing allows to be none at all (“raw”,
or the fastest), normalization, traditional frequency domain filters, wavelet-based filters, etc.
Feature extraction involves reducing an arbitrary length signal to a fixed length feature vector
of what thought to be the most relevant features are in the signal (e.g., spectral features in FFT,
LPC), min-max amplitudes, etc. Classification stage is then separated either to train by learning
the incoming feature vectors (usually k-means clusters, median clusters, or plain feature vector
collection, combined with e.g., neural network training) or testing them against the previously
learned models.
4.4.2 NLP Pipeline
The steps that are performed in NLP and the machine-learning based analysis are presented
in Figure 2. The specific algorithms again come from the classical literature (e.g., [MS02]) and
are detailed in [Mok10b] and the related works. To be more specific for this work, the loading
typically refers to the interpretation of the files being scanned in terms of n-grams: uni-gram,
bi-gram, or tri-gram approach and the associated statistical smoothing algorithms, the results
of which (a vector, 2D or 3D matrix) are stored.
4.5 Binary and Bytecode Analysis
In this iteration we also perform preliminary Java bytecode and compiled C code static analysis
and produce results using the same signal processing, NLP, combined with machine learning
and data mining techniques. At this writing, the NIST SAMATE synthetic reference data
set for Java and C was used. The algorithms presented in Section 4.4 are used as-is in this
scenario with the modifications to the index files. The modifications include removal of the
line numbers, source code fragments, and lines-of-text counts (which are largely meaningless
and ignored. The byte counts may be recomputed and capturing a byte offset instead of a line
number was projected. The filenames of the index files were updated to include -bin in them
to differentiate from the original index files describing the source code. Another point is at the
moment the simplifying assumption is that each compilable source file e.g., .java or .c produce
the corresponding .class and .o files that we examine. We do not examine inner classes or
linked executables or libraries at this point.
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// Construct an index mapping CVEs to files and locations within files
1 Compile meta-XML index files from the CVE reports (line numbers, CVE, CWE,
fragment size, etc.). Partly done by a Perl script and partly annotated manually;
2 foreach source code base, binary code base do
// Presently in these experiments we use simple mean clusters of
feature vectors or unigram language models per default MARF
specification ([Mok08b])
3 Train the system based on the meta index files to build the knowledge base (learn);
4 begin
5 Load (interpret as a wave signal or n− gram);
6 Preprocess (none, FFT-filters, wavelets, normalization, etc.);
7 Extract features (FFT, LPC, min-max, etc.);
8 Train (Similarity, Distance, Neural Network, etc.);
9 end
10 Test on the training data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat 5.5.13)
with the same annotations to make sure the results make sense by being high and
deduce the best algorithm combinations for the task;
11 begin
12 Load (same);
13 Preprocess (same);
14 Extract features (same);
15 Classify (compare to the trained k-means, or medians, or language models);
16 Report;
17 end
18 Similarly test on the testing data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat
5.5.13) without the annotations as a sanity check;
19 Test on the testing data for the fixed case of the same software (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13
on Tomcat 5.5.33);
20 Test on the testing data for the general non-CVE case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Pebble
or synthetic);
21 end
Figure 1: Machine-learning-based static code analysis testing algorithm using the signal
pipeline
4.6 Wavelets
As a part of a collaboration project with Dr. Yankui Sun from Tsinghua University, wavelet-
based signal processing for the purposes of noise filtering is being introduced with this work to
compare it to no-filtering, or FFT-based classical filtering. It’s been also shown in [LjXP+09] that
wavelet-aided filtering could be used as a fast preprocessing method for a network application
identification and traffic analysis [LKW08].
We rely in part on the the algorithm and methodology found in [AS01, SCL+03, KBC05,
KBC06], and at this point only a separating 1D discrete wavelet transform (SDWT) has been
tested (see Section 5.4.1).
Since the original wavelet implementation [SCL+03] is in MATLAB [Mat12a], [Sch07], we
used in part the codegen tool from the MATLAB Coder toolbox [Mat12b], [Mat12c] to generate
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1 Compile meta-XML index files from the CVE reports (line numbers, CVE, CWE,
fragment size, etc.). Partly done by a Perl script and partly annotated manually;
2 foreach source code base, binary code base do
// Presently in these experiments we use simple unigram language models
per default MARF specification ([Mok10b])
3 Train the system based on the meta index files to build the knowledge base (learn);
4 begin
5 Load (n-gram);
6 Train (statistical smoothing estimators);
7 end
8 Test on the training data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat 5.5.13)
with the same annotations to make sure the results make sense by being high and
deduce the best algorithm combinations for the task;
9 begin
10 Load (same);
11 Classify (compare to the trained language models);
12 Report;
13 end
14 Similarly test on the testing data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat
5.5.13) without the annotations as a sanity check;
15 Test on the testing data for the fixed case of the same software (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13
on Tomcat 5.5.33);
16 Test on the testing data for the general non-CVE case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Pebble
or synthetic);
17 end
Figure 2: Machine-learning-based static code analysis testing algorithm using the NLP
pipeline
a rough C/C++ equivalent in order to (manually) translate some fragments into Java (the
language of MARF and MARFCAT). The specific function for up/down sampling used by the
wavelets function in [Mot09] written also C/C++ was translated to Java in MARF as well with
unit tests added.
4.7 Demand-Driven Distributed Evaluation with GIPSY
To enhance the scalability of the approach, we convert the MARFCAT stand-alone application to
a distributed one using an eductive model of computation (demand-driven) implemented in the
General Intensional Programming System (GIPSY)’s multi-tier run-time system [Han10, Ji11,
Vas05, Paq09], which can be executed distributively using Jini (Apache River), or JMS [JMP13].
To adapt the application to the GIPSY’s multi-tier architecture, we create a problem-specific
generator and worker tiers (PS-DGT and PS-DWT respectively) for the MARFCAT application.
The generator(s) produce demands of what needs to be computed in the form of a file (source
code file or a compiled binary) to be evaluated and deposit such demands into a store managed
by the demand store tier (DST) as pending. Workers pickup pending demands from the store,
and them process then (all tiers run on multiple nodes) using a traditional MARFCAT instance.
Once the result (a Warning instance) is computed, the PS-DWT deposit it back into the store
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with the status set to computed. The generator “harvests” all computed results (warnings) and
produces the final report for a test cases. Multiple test cases can be evaluated simultaneously
or a single case can be evaluated distributively. This approach helps to cope with large amounts
of data and avoid recomputing warnings that have already been computed and cached in the
DST.
The initial basic experiment assumes the PS-DWTs have the training sets data and the test
cases available to them from the start (either by a copy or via an NFS/CIFS-mounted volumes);
thus, the distributed evaluation only concerns with the classification task only as of this version.
The follow up work will remove this limitation.
In this setup a demand represents a file (a path) to scan (actually an instance of the FileItem
object), which is deposited into the DST. The PS-DWT picks up that and checks the file per
training set that’s already there and returns a ResultSet object back into the DST under the
same demand signature that was used to deposit the path to scan. The result set is sorted from
the most likely to the list likely with a value corresponding to the distance or similarity. The
PS-DGT picks up the result sets and does the final output aggregation and saves report in one
of the desired report formats (see Section 4.8 picking up the top two results from the result set
and testing against a threshold to accept or reject the file (path) as vulnerable or not. This
effectively splits the monolithic MARFCAT application in two halves in distributing the work
to do where the classification half is arbitrary parallel.
Simplifying assumptions:
• Test case data and training sets are present on each node (physical or virtual) in ad-
vance (via a copy or a CIFS or NFS volume), so no demand driven training occurs, only
classification
• The demand assumes to contain only file information to be examined (FileItem)
• PS-DWT assumes a single pre-defined configuration, i.e. configuration for MARFCAT’s
option is not a part of the demand
• PS-DWT assume CVE or CWE testing based on its local settings and not via the config-
uration in a demand
4.8 Export
4.8.1 SATE
By default MARFCAT produces the report data in the SATE XML format, according to the
SATE IV requirements. In this iteration other formats are being considered and realized. To
enable multiple format output, the MARFCAT report generation data structures were adapted
case-based output.
4.8.2 Forensic Lucid
The first one, is Forensic Lucid, the author Mokhov’s PhD topic, a language to specify and
evaluate digital forensic cases by uniformly encoding the evidence and witness accounts (eviden-
tial statement or knowledge base) of any case from multiple sources (system specs, logs, human
accounts, etc.) as a description of an incident to further perform investigation and event recon-
struction. Following the data export in Forensic Lucid in the preceding work [MPD08, MPD10,
Mok08a] we use it asa format for evidential processing of the results produced by MARFCAT.
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The work [MPD08] provides details of the language; it will suffice to mention here that the report
generated by MARFCAT in Forensic Lucid is a collection of warnings as observations with the
hierarchical notion of nested context of warning and location information. These will form an
evidential statement in Forensic Lucid. The example scenario where such evidence compiled via
a MARFCAT Forensic Lucid report would be in web-based applications and web browser-based
incident investigations of fraud, XSS, buffer overflows, etc. linking CVE/CWE-based evidence
analysis of the code (binary or source) security bugs with the associated web-based malware
propagation or attacks to provide possible events where specific attacks can be traced back to
the specific security vulnerabilities.
4.8.3 SAFES
The third format, for which the export functionality is not done as of this writing, SAFES, is
the 3rd format for output of the MARFCAT. SAFES is becoming a standard to reporting such
information and the SATE organizers began endorsing it as an alternative during SATE IV.
4.9 Experiments
The below is the current summary of the conducted experiments:
• Re-testing of the newer fixed versions such as Wireshark 1.2.18 and Tomcat 5.5.33.
• Half-based testing of the previous versions by reducing the training set by half and but
testing for all known CVEs or CWEs for Wireshark 1.2.18, Tomcat 5.5.33, and Chrome
5.0.375.54.
• Testing the new test cases of Dovecot, Jetty 6.1.x, and Wordpress 2.x as well as Synthetic
C and Synthetic Java.
• Binary test on the Synthetic C and Synthetic Java test cases.
• Performing tests using wavelets for preprocessing.
5 Results
The preliminary results of application of our methodology are outlined in this section. We
summarize the top precisions per test case using either signal-processing or NLP-processing
of the CVE-based and synthetic cases and their application to the general cases. Subsequent
sections detail some of the findings and issues of MARFCAT’s result releases with different
versions. Some experiments we compare the results with the previously obtained ones [Mok10d]
where compatible and appropriate.
The results currently are being gradually released in the iterative manner that were obtained
through the corresponding versions of MARFCAT as it was being designed and developed.
5.1 Preliminary Results Summary
The results summarize the half-training-full-testing data vs. that of regular ones reported in
[Mok10d].
• Wireshark:
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– CVEs (signal): 92.68%, CWEs (signal): 86.11%,
– CVEs (NLP): 83.33%, CWEs (NLP): 58.33%
• Tomcat:
– CVEs (signal): 83.72%, CWEs (signal): 81.82%,
– CVEs (NLP): 87.88%, CWEs (NLP): 39.39%
• Chrome:
– CVEs (signal): 90.91%, CWEs (signal): 100.00%,
– CVEs (NLP): 100.00%, CWEs (NLP): 88.89%
• Dovecot (new, 2.x):
– 14 warnings; but it appears all quality or false positive
– (very hard to follow the code, severely undocumented)
• Pebble:
– none found during quick testing
• Dovecot 1.2.x: (ongoing of this writing)
• Jetty: (ongoing of this writing)
• Wordpress: (ongoing of this writing)
What follows are some select statistical measurements of the precision in recognizing CVEs
and CWEs under different configurations using the signal processing and NLP processing tech-
niques.
“Second guess” statistics provided to see if the hypothesis that if our first estimate of a
CVE/CWE is incorrect, the next one in line is probably the correct one. Both are counted if
the first guess is correct.
A sample signal visiusalization in the middle of a vulnerable file packet-afs.c in Wireshark
1.2.0 to CVE-2009-2562 is in Figure 3 in the wave form. The low “dips” represent the text line
endings (coupled with a preceding character (bytes) in bigrams (two PCM-signed bytes assumed
encoded in 8kHz representing the amplitude; normalized), which are often either semicolons,
closing or opening braces, brackets or parentheses). Only a small fragment is shown of roughly
300 bytes in length to be visually comprehensive of a nature of a signal we are dealing with.
In Figure 4, there are 3 spectrograms generated for the same file packet-afs.c. The first two
columns represent the CVE-2009-2562-vulnerable file, both versions are the same with ehanced
contrast to see the detail. The subsequent pairs are of the same file in Wireshark 1.2.9 and
Wireshark 1.2.18, where CVE-2009-2562 is no longer present. Small changes are noticeable
primarily in the bottom left and top right corners of the images, and even smaller elsewhere in
the images.
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Figure 3: A wave graph of a fraction of the CVE-2009-2562-vulnerable packet-afs.c in Wire-
shark 1.2.0
Figure 4: Spectrograms of CVE-2009-2562-vulnerable packet-afs.c in Wireshark 1.2.0, fixed
Wireshark 1.2.9 and Wireshark 1.2.18
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5.2 Version SATE-IV.1
5.2.1 Half-Training Data For Training and Full For Testing
This is one of the experiment per discussion with Aurelien Delaitre and SATE organizers. The
main idea is to test robustness and precision of the MARFCAT approach by artificially reducing
known weaknesses (their locations) to learn from by 50%, but test on the whole 100% to see how
much does precision degrade with such a reduction. Specifically, we supply only CWE classes
testing for this experiment (CVE classes make little sense). Only the first 50% of the entries
entries were used for training for Wireshark 1.2.0, Tomcat 5.5.13, and Chrome 5.0.375.54, while
the full 100% were used to test the precision changes. The below are the results.
It should be noted that CWE classification is generally less accurate due to a lot of dissimilar
items “stuffed” (by NVD) into very broad categories such as NVD-CWE-Other and NVD-CWE-
noinfo when the data were collected. Additionally, since we arbitrarily picked the first 50% of
the training data, some of the CWEs simply were left out completely and not trained on if they
were entirely in the omitted half, so their individual precision is obviously 0% when tested for.
The archive contains the .log and the .xml files (the latter for now are in SATE format only
with the scientific notation +E3 removed). The best reports are:
report-cweidnoprepreprawfftcheb-wireshark-1.2.0-half-train-cwe.xml
report-cweidnoprepreprawfftdiff-wireshark-1.2.0-half-train-cwe.xml
The experiments are subdivided into regular (signal) and NLP based testing.
Signal
• Wireshark 1.2.0:
Reduction of the training data by half resulted in ≈ 14% precision drop compared to the
previous result (best 86.11% see the NIST report [Mok11], vs. 72.22% overall).
New results (by algorithms, then by CWEs):
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guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb 26 10 72.22
1st 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff 26 10 72.22
1st 3 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl 22 14 61.11
1st 4 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos 25 23 52.08
1st 5 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink 17 19 47.22
1st 6 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 17 19 47.22
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb 30 6 83.33
2nd 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff 30 6 83.33
2nd 3 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl 24 12 66.67
2nd 4 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos 32 16 66.67
2nd 5 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink 23 13 63.89
2nd 6 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 24 12 66.67
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 68 39 63.55
1st 2 CWE-20 38 22 63.33
1st 3 CWE-119 18 14 56.25
1st 4 NVD-CWE-Other 9 8 52.94
1st 5 CWE-189 0 12 0.00
2nd 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 84 23 78.50
2nd 2 CWE-20 39 21 65.00
2nd 3 CWE-119 29 3 90.62
2nd 4 NVD-CWE-Other 11 6 64.71
2nd 5 CWE-189 0 12 0.00
• Tomcat 5.5.13:
Drop from 81.82% (see NIST report’s Table 7, p. 70) to 75% top result as a result (about
7 points) of training data reduction by 50%.
New precision estimates:
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guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff 6 2 75.00
1st 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 5 9 35.71
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff 6 2 75.00
2nd 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 8 6 57.14
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CWE-264 1 0 100.00
1st 2 CWE-255 2 0 100.00
1st 3 CWE-200 1 0 100.00
1st 4 CWE-22 6 3 66.67
1st 5 CWE-79 1 4 20.00
1st 6 CWE-119 0 2 0.00
1st 7 CWE-20 0 2 0.00
2nd 1 CWE-264 1 0 100.00
2nd 2 CWE-255 2 0 100.00
2nd 3 CWE-200 1 0 100.00
2nd 4 CWE-22 7 2 77.78
2nd 5 CWE-79 3 2 60.00
2nd 6 CWE-119 0 2 0.00
2nd 7 CWE-20 0 2 0.00
• Chrome 5.0.375.54:
Chrome result is for completeness even though it is not a test case for SATE IV. Chrome is
poor for some reason—drop from 100% (Table 5, p. 68) to 44.44%, but it’s only 9 entries.
The first result in the table is erroenous, i.e., with a poor recall (the sum of 2 + 0 < 9,
should be total 9).
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guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos 2 0 100.00
1st 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl 4 5 44.44
1st 3 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb 3 6 33.33
1st 4 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 3 6 33.33
1st 5 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink 2 7 22.22
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos 2 0 100.00
2nd 2 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl 4 5 44.44
2nd 3 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb 4 5 44.44
2nd 4 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming 4 5 44.44
2nd 5 -cweid -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink 3 6 33.33
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CWE-94 6 3 66.67
1st 2 CWE-20 3 2 60.00
1st 3 CWE-79 2 2 50.00
1st 4 NVD-CWE-noinfo 2 2 50.00
1st 5 NVD-CWE-Other 1 7 12.50
1st 6 CWE-399 0 4 0.00
1st 7 CWE-119 0 4 0.00
2nd 1 CWE-94 6 3 66.67
2nd 2 CWE-20 3 2 60.00
2nd 3 CWE-79 3 1 75.00
2nd 4 NVD-CWE-noinfo 3 1 75.00
2nd 5 NVD-CWE-Other 2 6 25.00
2nd 6 CWE-399 0 4 0.00
2nd 7 CWE-119 0 4 0.00
NLP Generally this genre of classification was poor as before in this experiment, all around
40-45% percent precision.
• Wireshark 1.2.0:
New results (by algorithms, then by CWEs):
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 15 21 41.67
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 23 13 63.89
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 11 7 61.11
1st 2 NVD-CWE-Other 1 1 50.00
1st 3 CWE-119 2 3 40.00
1st 4 CWE-20 1 9 10.00
1st 5 CWE-189 0 1 0.00
2nd 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 17 1 94.44
2nd 2 NVD-CWE-Other 1 1 50.00
2nd 3 CWE-119 4 1 80.00
2nd 4 CWE-20 1 9 10.00
2nd 5 CWE-189 0 1 0.00
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• Tomcat 5.5.13:
Intriguingly, the best result is higher than with all of the date in the past report (42.42%
below vs. previous 39.39%).
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 14 19 42.42
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 18 15 54.55
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CWE-255 1 0 100.00
1st 2 CWE-264 2 0 100.00
1st 3 CWE-119 1 0 100.00
1st 4 CWE-20 1 0 100.00
1st 5 CWE-22 7 9 43.75
1st 6 CWE-200 1 3 25.00
1st 7 CWE-79 1 6 14.29
1st 8 CWE-16 0 1 0.00
2nd 1 CWE-255 1 0 100.00
2nd 2 CWE-264 2 0 100.00
2nd 3 CWE-119 1 0 100.00
2nd 4 CWE-20 1 0 100.00
2nd 5 CWE-22 11 5 68.75
2nd 6 CWE-200 1 3 25.00
2nd 7 CWE-79 1 6 14.29
2nd 8 CWE-16 0 1 0.00
• Chrome 5.0.375.54:
Here drop is twice as much (≈ 44% vs. 88%).
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 4 5 44.44
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -char -unigram -add-delta 5 4 55.56
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 1 0 100.00
1st 2 CWE-79 1 0 100.00
1st 3 CWE-20 1 0 100.00
1st 4 CWE-94 1 1 50.00
1st 5 CWE-399 0 1 0.00
1st 6 NVD-CWE-Other 0 2 0.00
1st 7 CWE-119 0 1 0.00
2nd 1 NVD-CWE-noinfo 1 0 100.00
2nd 2 CWE-79 1 0 100.00
2nd 3 CWE-20 1 0 100.00
2nd 4 CWE-94 1 1 50.00
2nd 5 CWE-399 0 1 0.00
2nd 6 NVD-CWE-Other 0 2 0.00
2nd 7 CWE-119 1 0 100.00
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5.3 Version SATE-IV.2
These runs represent using the same SATE2010 training data for Tomcat 5.5.13 and Wireshark
1.2.0 to test the updated fixed versions (as from SATE2010) to Tomcat 5.5.33 and Wireshark
1.2.18 using the same settings. At this run, no new CVEs that may have happened from the
previous fixed versions of Tomcat 5.5.29 and Wireshark 1.2.9 respectively in 2010 were added
to the training data for the versions being tested in this experiment as to see if any old issues
reoccur or not. In this short summary, both signal and NLP testing reveal no same known issues
found.
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve
This is CVE-based classical signal classification.
A typical MARFCAT run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. For most reports, no warnings
were spotted based on what was learned from 5.5.13, so the reports convey earlier CVEs
were fixed.
Empty reports like:
report-noprepreprawfftcheb-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
However, the -cos report is noisy and non-empty:
report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
Overly detailed log files are also provided.
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe
This is classical CWE-based testing.
A typical MARFCAT CWE run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training.
No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
Most of the reports are empty, e.g.:
report-nopreprepcharunigramadddelta-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve-nlp.
xml
The -cos report is not as noisy as for CVEs, but still contains a couple of false positives.
report-cweidnoprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe.
xml
Overly detailed log files also provided.
Training and testing indexes are provided (*_test.xml and *_train.xml).
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve-nlp
This is CVE-based NLP testing.
A typical MARFCAT NLP run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. Usually a slow run, so
only one configuration is tried. No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
The only empty report is:
report-nopreprepcharunigramadddelta-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve-nlp.
xml
However, the -cos report is noisy and non-empty:
19
MARFCAT: A MARF Approach to SATE IV Mokhov, Paquet, Debbabi, Sun
report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
Overly detailed log files also provided.
Training and testing indexes are provided (*_test.xml and *_train.xml).
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe-nlp
This is CWE-based NLP testing.
A typical MARFCAT CWE NLP run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. Usually a slow
run, so only one configuration is tried. No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
The only empty report is:
report-cweidnopreprepcharunigramadddelta-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe-nlp.
xml
Overly detailed log files also provided.
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve
Test Wireshark 1.2.18 using the training data from Wireshark 1.2.0 and classical CVE-
based processing.
Majority of algorithms returned empty reports. -cos was as noisy as usual, but -mink
was non-empty but quite short (though also presumed with false positives).
Empty reports:
report-noprepreprawfftcheb-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
report-noprepreprawfftdiff-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
report-noprepreprawffteucl-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
report-noprepreprawffthamming-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
Non empty reports:
report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
report-noprepreprawfftmink-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
Verbose log files and input index files are also supplied for the most cases.
[TODO]
5.4 Version SATE-IV.5
5.4.1 Wavelet Experiments
The preliminary experiments using the separating discreet wavelet transform (DWT) filter are
summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 for CVEs and CWEs respectively. For comparison, the
low-pass FFT filter is used for the same as shown in Table 1 and Table 4 respectively. For the
CVE experiments, the wavelet transforms overall produces better precision across configurations
(larger number of configurations produce higher precision result) than those with the low-pass
FFT filter. While the top precision result remains the same, it is shown than when filtering
is wanted, the wavelet transform is perhaps a better choice for some configurations, e.g., from
4 and below as well as for the Second Guess statistics. The very top result for the CWE
based processing so far exceeds the overall precision of separating DWT vs. low-pass FFT,
which then drops below for the subsequent configurations. -cos was dropped from Table 3 for
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technical reasons. In Figure 5 is a spectrogram with the SDWT preprocessing in the pipeline.
More exploration in this area is under way for more advanced wavelet filters than the simple
separating DWT filter as to see whether they would outperform -raw or not and at the same
time minimizing the run-time performance decrease with the extra filtering.
Figure 5: A spectrogram of CVE-2009-2562-vulnerable packet-afs.c in Wireshark 1.2.0, after
SDWT
6 Conclusion
We review the current results of this experimental work, its current shortcomings, advantages,
and practical implications.
6.1 Shortcomings
Following is a list of the most prominent issues with the presented approach. Some of them are
more “permanent”, while others are solvable and intended to be addressed in the future work.
Specifically:
• Looking at a signal is less intuitive visually for code analysis by humans. (However, can
produce a problematic “spectrogram” in some cases).
• Line numbers are a problem (easily “filtered out” as high-frequency “noise”, etc.). A
whole “relativistic” and machine learning methodology developed for the line numbers
in [Mok10d] to compensate for that. Generally, when CVEs are the primary class, by
accurately identifying the CVE number one can get all the other pertinent details from
the CVE database, including patches and line numbers making this a lesser issue.
• Accuracy depends on the quality of the knowledge base (see Section 4.2) collected. Some of
this collection and annotation is manual to get the indexes right, and, hence, error prone.
“Garbage in – garbage out.”
• To detect more of the useful CVE or CWE signatures in non-CVE and non-CWE cases
requires large knowledge bases (human-intensive to collect), which can perhaps be shared
by different vendors via a common format, such as SATE, SAFES or Forensic Lucid.
• No path tracing (since no parsing is present); no slicing, semantic annotations, context,
locality of reference, etc. The “sink”, “path”, and “fix” results in the reports also have to
be machine-learned.
• A lot of algorithms and their combinations to try (currently ≈ 1800 permutations) to get
the best top N. This is, however, also an advantage of the approach as the underlying
framework can quickly allow for such testing.
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• File-level training vs. fragment-level training – presently the classes are trained based
on the entire file where weaknesses are found instead of the known file fragments from
CVE-reported patches. The latter would be more fine-grained and precise than whole-file
classification, but slower. However, overall the file-level processing is a man-hour limitation
than a technological one.
• Separating wavelet filter performance is rather adversely affects the precision to low levels.
• No nice GUI. Presently the application is script/command-line based.
6.2 Advantages
There are some key advantages of the approach presented. Some of them follow:
• Relatively fast (e.g., Wireshark’s ≈ 2400 files train and test in about 3 minutes) on a
now-commodity desktop or a laptop.
• Language-independent (no parsing) – given enough examples can apply to any language,
i.e. methodology is the same no matter C, C++, Java or any other source or binary
languages (PHP, C#, VB, Perl, bytecode, assembly, etc.) are used.
• Can automatically learn a large knowledge base to test on known and unknown cases.
• Can be used to quickly pre-scan projects for further analysis by humans or other tools
that do in-depth semantic analysis as a means to prioritize.
• Can learn from SATE’08, SATE’09, SATE’10, and SATE IV reports.
• Generally, high precision (and recall) in CVE and CWE detection, even at the file level.
• A lot of algorithms and their combinations to select the best for a particular task or class
(see Section 4.3).
• Can cope with altered code or code used in other projects (e.g., a lot of problems in Chrome
were found it WebKit, used by several browsers).
6.3 Practical Implications
Most practical implications of all static code analyzers are obvious—to detect source code weak-
nesses and report them appropriately to the developers. We outline additional implications this
approach brings to the arsenal below:
• The approach can be used on any target language without modifications to the method-
ology or knowing the syntax of the language. Thus, it scales to any popular and new
language analysis with a very small amount of effort.
• The approach can nearly identically be transposed onto the compiled binaries and byte-
code, detecting vulnerable deployments and installations—akin to virus scanning of bina-
ries, but instead scanning for infected binaries, one would scan for security-weak binaries
on site deployments to alert system administrators to upgrade their packages.
• Can learn from binary signatures from other tools like Snort [Sou13].
• The approach is easily extendable to the embedded code and mission-critical code found
in aircraft, spacecraft, and various autonomous systems.
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6.4 Future Work
There is a great number of possibilities in the future work. This includes improvements to
the code base of MARFCAT as well as resolving unfinished scenarios and results, addressing
shortcomings in Section 6.1, testing more algorithms and combinations from the related work,
and moving onto other programming languages (e.g., ASP, C#). Furthermore, foster collabo-
ration with the academic, industry (such as VeraCode, Coverity) and government vendors and
others who have vast data sets to test the full potential of the approach with the others and a
community as a whole. Then, move on to dynamic code analysis as well applying similar tech-
niques there. Other near-future work items include realization of the SVM-based classification,
data export in SAFES and Forensic Lucid formats, a lot of wavelet filtering improvements, and
distributed GIPSY cluster-based evaluation.
To improve detection and classification of the malware in the network traffic or otherwise
we employ machine learning approach to static pcap payload malicious code analysis and fin-
gerprinting using the open-source MARF framework and its MARFCAT application, originally
designed for the SATE static analysis tool exposition workshop. We first train on the known
malware pcap data and measure the precision and then test it on the unseen, but known data
and select the best available machine learning combination to do so. This work elaborates
on the details of the methodology and the corresponding results of application of the machine
learning techniques along with signal processing and NLP alike to static network packet anal-
ysis in search for malicious code in the packet capture (pcap) data. malicious code analysis
[BOB+10, SEZS01, SXCM04, HJ07, HRSS07, Sue07, RM08, BOA+07] We show the system the
examples of pcap files with malware and MARFCAT learns them by computing spectral sig-
natures using signal processing techniques. When we test, we compute how similar or distant
each file is from the known trained-on malware-laden files. In part, the methodology can ap-
proximately be seen as some signature-based “antivirus” or IDS software systems detect bad
signature, except that with a large number of machine learning and signal processing algorithms,
we test to find out which combination gives the highest precision and best run-time. At the
present, however, we are looking at the whole pcap files. This aspect lowers the precision, but
is fast to scan all the files. The malware database with known malware, the reports, etc. serves
as a knowledge base to machine-learn from. Thus, we primarily:
• Teach the system from the known cases of malware from their pcap data
• Test on the known cases
• Test on the unseen cases
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A Classification Result Tables
What follows are result tables with top classification results ranked from most precise at the
top. This include the configuration settings for MARF by the means of options (the algorithm
implementations are at their defaults [Mok08b]).
B Forensic Lucid Report Example
An example report encoding the reported data in Forensic Lucid for Wireshark 1.2.0 after using
simple FFT-based feature extraction and Chebyshev distance as a classifier. The report provides
the same data, compressed, as the SATE XML, but in the Forensic Lucid syntax for automated
reasoning and event reconstruction during a digital investigation. The example is a an evidential
statement context encoded for the use in the investigator’s knowledge base of a particular case.
#FORENSICLUCID
evidential statement report_marfcat_0_0_2_SATE_IV_4
{
weakness_1 @ [id:1, tool_specific_id:1, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_1 = (locations_wk_1, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_1 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:1, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_340( [line => 828, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-afs.c")
observation location_id_340( [line => 1718, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-afs.c")
observation location_id_340( [line => 1729, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-afs.c")
observation location_id_340( [line => 1740, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-afs.c")
observation location_id_340( [line => 1747, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-afs.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_2 @ [id:2, tool_specific_id:2, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_2 = (locations_wk_2, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_2 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:2, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"];
observation location_id_411( [line => 830, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c")
observation location_id_411( [line => 861, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c")
observation location_id_411( [line => 885, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_3 @ [id:3, tool_specific_id:3, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_3 = (locations_wk_3, 1, 0, 0.004878625561362933);
locations_wk_3 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:3, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_433( [line => 669, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-btl2cap.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 204.97576364943077], 1, 0, 0.004878625561362933);
end;
weakness_4 @ [id:4, tool_specific_id:4, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_4 = (locations_wk_4, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_4 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:4, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_550( [line => 248, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 252, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 256, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1138, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1142, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1146, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1201, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1205, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1209, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1314, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1318, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
observation location_id_550( [line => 1322, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-nt.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_5 @ [id:5, tool_specific_id:5, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
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Table 1: CVE Stats for Wireshark 1.2.0, Low-Pass FFT Filter Preprocessing
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 37 4 90.24
1st 2 -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 37 4 90.24
1st 3 -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 27 14 65.85
1st 4 -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 23 18 56.10
1st 5 -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 22 19 53.66
1st 6 -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 36 114 24.00
2nd 1 -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 38 3 92.68
2nd 2 -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 38 3 92.68
2nd 3 -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 34 7 82.93
2nd 4 -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 26 15 63.41
2nd 5 -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 31 10 75.61
2nd 6 -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 39 111 26.00
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CVE-2009-3829 6 0 100.00
1st 2 CVE-2009-4376 6 0 100.00
1st 3 CVE-2010-0304 6 0 100.00
1st 4 CVE-2010-2286 6 0 100.00
1st 5 CVE-2010-2283 6 0 100.00
1st 6 CVE-2009-3551 6 0 100.00
1st 7 CVE-2009-3549 6 0 100.00
1st 8 CVE-2009-3241 15 9 62.50
1st 9 CVE-2009-2560 9 6 60.00
1st 10 CVE-2010-1455 30 24 55.56
1st 11 CVE-2009-2563 6 5 54.55
1st 12 CVE-2009-2562 6 5 54.55
1st 13 CVE-2009-2561 6 7 46.15
1st 14 CVE-2009-4378 6 7 46.15
1st 15 CVE-2010-2287 6 7 46.15
1st 16 CVE-2009-3550 6 8 42.86
1st 17 CVE-2009-3243 13 23 36.11
1st 18 CVE-2009-4377 12 22 35.29
1st 19 CVE-2010-2285 6 11 35.29
1st 20 CVE-2009-2559 6 11 35.29
1st 21 CVE-2010-2284 6 12 33.33
1st 22 CVE-2009-3242 7 16 30.43
2nd 1 CVE-2009-3829 6 0 100.00
2nd 2 CVE-2009-4376 6 0 100.00
2nd 3 CVE-2010-0304 6 0 100.00
2nd 4 CVE-2010-2286 6 0 100.00
2nd 5 CVE-2010-2283 6 0 100.00
2nd 6 CVE-2009-3551 6 0 100.00
2nd 7 CVE-2009-3549 6 0 100.00
2nd 8 CVE-2009-3241 16 8 66.67
2nd 9 CVE-2009-2560 10 5 66.67
2nd 10 CVE-2010-1455 44 10 81.48
2nd 11 CVE-2009-2563 6 5 54.55
2nd 12 CVE-2009-2562 6 5 54.55
2nd 13 CVE-2009-2561 6 7 46.15
2nd 14 CVE-2009-4378 6 7 46.15
2nd 15 CVE-2010-2287 13 0 100.00
2nd 16 CVE-2009-3550 6 8 42.86
2nd 17 CVE-2009-3243 13 23 36.11
2nd 18 CVE-2009-4377 12 22 35.29
2nd 19 CVE-2010-2285 6 11 35.29
2nd 20 CVE-2009-2559 6 11 35.29
2nd 21 CVE-2010-2284 6 12 33.33
2nd 22 CVE-2009-3242 8 15 34.78
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Table 2: CVE Stats for Wireshark 1.2.0, Separating DWT Wavelet Filter Preprocessing
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -spectrogram -graph -flucid 37 4 90.24
1st 2 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cheb -spectrogram -graph -flucid 37 4 90.24
1st 3 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -spectrogram -graph -flucid 27 14 65.85
1st 4 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -spectrogram -graph -flucid 26 15 63.41
1st 5 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -spectrogram -graph -flucid 22 19 53.66
1st 6 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cos -spectrogram -graph -flucid 38 65 36.89
2nd 1 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -spectrogram -graph -flucid 39 2 95.12
2nd 2 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cheb -spectrogram -graph -flucid 39 2 95.12
2nd 3 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -spectrogram -graph -flucid 35 6 85.37
2nd 4 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -spectrogram -graph -flucid 29 12 70.73
2nd 5 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -spectrogram -graph -flucid 31 10 75.61
2nd 6 -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cos -spectrogram -graph -flucid 39 64 37.86
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CVE-2009-3829 6 0 100.00
1st 2 CVE-2009-2562 6 0 100.00
1st 3 CVE-2009-4378 6 0 100.00
1st 4 CVE-2010-2286 6 0 100.00
1st 5 CVE-2010-0304 6 0 100.00
1st 6 CVE-2009-4376 6 0 100.00
1st 7 CVE-2010-2283 6 0 100.00
1st 8 CVE-2009-3551 6 0 100.00
1st 9 CVE-2009-3550 6 0 100.00
1st 10 CVE-2009-3549 6 0 100.00
1st 11 CVE-2009-2563 6 2 75.00
1st 12 CVE-2009-2560 11 4 73.33
1st 13 CVE-2009-3241 15 9 62.50
1st 14 CVE-2010-1455 31 23 57.41
1st 15 CVE-2009-2561 6 6 50.00
1st 16 CVE-2010-2287 6 6 50.00
1st 17 CVE-2009-2559 6 6 50.00
1st 18 CVE-2009-3243 16 16 50.00
1st 19 CVE-2010-2285 6 7 46.15
1st 20 CVE-2009-4377 12 16 42.86
1st 21 CVE-2010-2284 6 9 40.00
1st 22 CVE-2009-3242 6 17 26.09
2nd 1 CVE-2009-3829 6 0 100.00
2nd 2 CVE-2009-2562 6 0 100.00
2nd 3 CVE-2009-4378 6 0 100.00
2nd 4 CVE-2010-2286 6 0 100.00
2nd 5 CVE-2010-0304 6 0 100.00
2nd 6 CVE-2009-4376 6 0 100.00
2nd 7 CVE-2010-2283 6 0 100.00
2nd 8 CVE-2009-3551 6 0 100.00
2nd 9 CVE-2009-3550 6 0 100.00
2nd 10 CVE-2009-3549 6 0 100.00
2nd 11 CVE-2009-2563 6 2 75.00
2nd 12 CVE-2009-2560 12 3 80.00
2nd 13 CVE-2009-3241 16 8 66.67
2nd 14 CVE-2010-1455 43 11 79.63
2nd 15 CVE-2009-2561 6 6 50.00
2nd 16 CVE-2010-2287 12 0 100.00
2nd 17 CVE-2009-2559 6 6 50.00
2nd 18 CVE-2009-3243 19 13 59.38
2nd 19 CVE-2010-2285 6 7 46.15
2nd 20 CVE-2009-4377 12 16 42.86
2nd 21 CVE-2010-2284 6 9 40.00
2nd 22 CVE-2009-3242 8 15 34.78
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Table 3: CWE Stats for Wireshark 1.2.0, Separating DWT Wavelet Filter Preprocessing
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -flucid 31 5 86.11
1st 2 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -flucid 29 7 80.56
1st 3 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -flucid 17 19 47.22
1st 4 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -flucid 14 22 38.89
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -flucid 33 3 91.67
2nd 2 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -flucid 34 2 94.44
2nd 3 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -flucid 27 9 75.00
2nd 4 -cweid -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -flucid 23 13 63.89
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CWE399 4 0 100.00
1st 2 CWE189 4 0 100.00
1st 3 NVD-CWE-Other 11 1 91.67
1st 4 CWE20 30 10 75.00
1st 5 NVD-CWE-noinfo 34 34 50.00
1st 6 CWE119 8 8 50.00
2nd 1 CWE399 4 0 100.00
2nd 2 CWE189 4 0 100.00
2nd 3 NVD-CWE-Other 11 1 91.67
2nd 4 CWE20 34 6 85.00
2nd 5 NVD-CWE-noinfo 53 15 77.94
2nd 6 CWE119 11 5 68.75
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_5 = (locations_wk_5, 1, 0, 0.003778693428627627);
locations_wk_5 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:5, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_652( [line => 77, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 264.64173897356557], 1, 0, 0.003778693428627627);
end;
weakness_6 @ [id:6, tool_specific_id:6, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_6 = (locations_wk_6, 1, 0, 0.004125022212036806);
locations_wk_6 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:6, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_763( [line => 8447, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-gsm_a_rr.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 242.42293704067873], 1, 0, 0.004125022212036806);
end;
weakness_7 @ [id:7, tool_specific_id:7, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_7 = (locations_wk_7, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_7 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:7, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_863( [line => 945, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-infiniband.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_8 @ [id:8, tool_specific_id:8, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_8 = (locations_wk_8, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_8 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:8, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"];
observation location_id_877( [line => 2746, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ipmi-se.c")
observation location_id_877( [line => 2748, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ipmi-se.c")
observation location_id_877( [line => 2752, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ipmi-se.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_9 @ [id:9, tool_specific_id:9, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_9 = (locations_wk_9, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_9 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:9, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"];
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Table 4: CWE Stats for Wireshark 1.2.0, Low-Pass FFT Filter Preprocessing
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 30 6 83.33
1st 2 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 30 6 83.33
1st 3 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 25 11 69.44
1st 4 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 20 16 55.56
1st 5 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 36 40 47.37
1st 6 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 12 24 33.33
2nd 1 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 31 5 86.11
2nd 2 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 31 5 86.11
2nd 3 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 30 6 83.33
2nd 4 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 22 14 61.11
2nd 5 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 48 28 63.16
2nd 6 -cweid -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 16 20 44.44
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 CWE399 6 1 85.71
1st 2 CWE20 48 12 80.00
1st 3 NVD-CWE-Other 18 7 72.00
1st 4 CWE189 6 3 66.67
1st 5 NVD-CWE-noinfo 61 61 50.00
1st 6 CWE119 14 19 42.42
2nd 1 CWE399 6 1 85.71
2nd 2 CWE20 48 12 80.00
2nd 3 NVD-CWE-Other 18 7 72.00
2nd 4 CWE189 6 3 66.67
2nd 5 NVD-CWE-noinfo 78 44 63.93
2nd 6 CWE119 22 11 66.67
observation location_id_882( [line => 792, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ipmi.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_10 @ [id:10, tool_specific_id:10, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_10 = (locations_wk_10, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_10 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:10, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"];
observation location_id_969( [line => 523, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-lwres.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_11 @ [id:11, tool_specific_id:11, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_11 = (locations_wk_11, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_11 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:11, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_1099( [line => 62, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-paltalk.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_12 @ [id:12, tool_specific_id:12, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_12 = (locations_wk_12, 1, 0, 0.004878625561362927);
locations_wk_12 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:12, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1174( [line => 897, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-radius.c")
observation location_id_1174( [line => 906, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-radius.c")
observation location_id_1174( [line => 913, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-radius.c")
observation location_id_1174( [line => 1005, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-radius.c")
observation location_id_1174( [line => 1227, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-radius.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 204.975763649431], 1, 0, 0.004878625561362927);
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end;
weakness_13 @ [id:13, tool_specific_id:13, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_13 = (locations_wk_13, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_13 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:13, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1282( [line => 1131, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-sflow.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_14 @ [id:14, tool_specific_id:14, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_14 = (locations_wk_14, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_14 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:14, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"];
observation location_id_1303( [line => 2141, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-smb-pipe.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_15 @ [id:15, tool_specific_id:15, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_15 = (locations_wk_15, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_15 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:15, cweid:998, cwename:"Other (NVD-CWE-Other)"];
observation location_id_1307( [line => 8757, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-smb.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_16 @ [id:16, tool_specific_id:16, cweid:189, cwename:"Numeric Errors (CWE189)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_16 = (locations_wk_16, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_16 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:16, cweid:189, cwename:"Numeric Errors (CWE189)"];
observation location_id_1307( [line => 2195, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-smb.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 2, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_17 @ [id:17, tool_specific_id:17, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_17 = (locations_wk_17, 1, 0, 0.008328136212759968);
locations_wk_17 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:17, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1307( [line => 8457, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-smb.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 120.07488523877028], 1, 0, 0.008328136212759968);
end;
weakness_18 @ [id:18, tool_specific_id:18, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_18 = (locations_wk_18, 1, 0, 0.008328136212759964);
locations_wk_18 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:18, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1309( [line => 955, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-smb2.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 120.07488523877032], 1, 0, 0.008328136212759964);
end;
weakness_19 @ [id:19, tool_specific_id:19, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_19 = (locations_wk_19, 1, 0, 0.004321352067642762);
locations_wk_19 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:19, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1333( [line => 813, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c")
observation location_id_1333( [line => 843, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 231.40905539443497], 1, 0, 0.004321352067642762);
end;
weakness_20 @ [id:20, tool_specific_id:20, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_20 = (locations_wk_20, 1, 0, 0.0021114804997331383);
locations_wk_20 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:20, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1334( [line => 153, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 473.60134281438354], 1, 0, 0.0021114804997331383);
end;
weakness_21 @ [id:21, tool_specific_id:21, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_21 = (locations_wk_21, 1, 0, 0.003463630817441021);
locations_wk_21 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:21, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1335( [line => 275, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 288.71437306901373], 1, 0, 0.003463630817441021);
end;
weakness_22 @ [id:22, tool_specific_id:22, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_22 = (locations_wk_22, 1, 0, 0.004125022212036806);
locations_wk_22 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:22, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_1583( [line => 1799, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/packet.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 242.42293704067873], 1, 0, 0.004125022212036806);
end;
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weakness_23 @ [id:23, tool_specific_id:23, cweid:399, cwename:"Resource Management Errors (CWE399)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_23 = (locations_wk_23, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_23 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:23, cweid:399, cwename:"Resource Management Errors (CWE399)"];
observation location_id_1611( [line => 345, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/sigcomp-udvm.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 3, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_24 @ [id:24, tool_specific_id:24, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_24 = (locations_wk_24, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_24 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:24, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"];
observation location_id_1611( [line => 321, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/epan/sigcomp-udvm.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_25 @ [id:25, tool_specific_id:25, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_25 = (locations_wk_25, 1, 0, 0.001495003320843141);
locations_wk_25 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:25, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2012( [line => 89, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-bpkmreq.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 668.8948352542972], 1, 0, 0.001495003320843141);
end;
weakness_26 @ [id:26, tool_specific_id:26, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_26 = (locations_wk_26, 1, 0, 0.0014959114047375394);
locations_wk_26 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:26, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2013( [line => 90, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-bpkmrsp.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 668.4887867242726], 1, 0, 0.0014959114047375394);
end;
weakness_27 @ [id:27, tool_specific_id:27, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_27 = (locations_wk_27, 1, 0, 0.002153585613826869);
locations_wk_27 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:27, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2020( [line => 72, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-dsaack.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 464.341883405798], 1, 0, 0.002153585613826869);
end;
weakness_28 @ [id:28, tool_specific_id:28, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_28 = (locations_wk_28, 1, 0, 0.00229165238295895);
locations_wk_28 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:28, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2022( [line => 72, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-dsarsp.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 436.36635618741343], 1, 0, 0.00229165238295895);
end;
weakness_29 @ [id:29, tool_specific_id:29, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_29 = (locations_wk_29, 1, 0, 0.002184230355798278);
locations_wk_29 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:29, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2023( [line => 72, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-dscack.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 457.82716889058463], 1, 0, 0.002184230355798278);
end;
weakness_30 @ [id:30, tool_specific_id:30, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_30 = (locations_wk_30, 1, 0, 0.0023006295251237975);
locations_wk_30 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:30, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2025( [line => 73, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-dscrsp.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 434.6636383996635], 1, 0, 0.0023006295251237975);
end;
weakness_31 @ [id:31, tool_specific_id:31, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_31 = (locations_wk_31, 1, 0, 0.001897888480826156);
locations_wk_31 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:31, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2032( [line => 72, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-regack.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 526.9013485790784], 1, 0, 0.001897888480826156);
end;
weakness_32 @ [id:32, tool_specific_id:32, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_32 = (locations_wk_32, 1, 0, 0.002216818195096963);
locations_wk_32 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:32, cweid:20, cwename:"Input Validation (CWE20)"];
observation location_id_2035( [line => 73, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/docsis/packet-regrsp.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 451.096983149879], 1, 0, 0.002216818195096963);
end;
weakness_33 @ [id:33, tool_specific_id:33, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
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dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_33 = (locations_wk_33, 1, 0, 0.0028814675905206645);
locations_wk_33 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:33, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_2097( [line => 433, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_complextypeparser.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 347.04537482557834], 1, 0, 0.0028814675905206645);
end;
weakness_34 @ [id:34, tool_specific_id:34, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_34 = (locations_wk_34, 1, 0, 0.0028288900371324934);
locations_wk_34 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:34, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_2107( [line => 616, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_serviceparser.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 353.49553601371184], 1, 0, 0.0028288900371324934);
end;
weakness_35 @ [id:35, tool_specific_id:35, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_35 = (locations_wk_35, 1, 0, 0.003058220966230374);
locations_wk_35 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:35, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_2110( [line => 340, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_simpletypes.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 326.9874907805045], 1, 0, 0.003058220966230374);
end;
weakness_36 @ [id:36, tool_specific_id:36, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_36 = (locations_wk_36, 1, 0, 0.0018096494904338023);
locations_wk_36 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:36, cweid:999, cwename:"Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)"];
observation location_id_2112( [line => 132, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
observation location_id_2112( [line => 169, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
observation location_id_2112( [line => 181, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
observation location_id_2112( [line => 195, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
observation location_id_2112( [line => 226, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
observation location_id_2112( [line => 250, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/plugins/opcua/opcua_transport_layer.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 5, tool_specific_rank => 552.593198454295], 1, 0, 0.0018096494904338023);
end;
weakness_37 @ [id:37, tool_specific_id:37, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_37 = (locations_wk_37, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_37 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:37, cweid:119, cwename:"Buffer Errors (CWE119)"];
observation location_id_2321( [line => 149, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/wiretap/daintree-sna.c")
observation location_id_2321( [line => 205, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/wiretap/daintree-sna.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 1, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
weakness_38 @ [id:38, tool_specific_id:38, cweid:189, cwename:"Numeric Errors (CWE189)"]
where
dimension id, tool_specific_id, cweid, cwename;
observation sequence weakness_38 = (locations_wk_38, 1, 0, 1.0);
locations_wk_38 = locations @ [tool_specific_id:38, cweid:189, cwename:"Numeric Errors (CWE189)"];
observation location_id_2327( [line => 228, path => "wireshark-1.2.0/wiretap/erf.c")
textoutput="";
observation grade = ([ severity => 2, tool_specific_rank => 0.0], 1, 0, 1.0);
end;
}
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